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Abstract: This paper rationalizes as the outcome of an optimal policy decision the pattern of reserve 
requirements and other macroeconomic variables in the aftermath of a bank run. The paper develops a general 
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(i) capital mobility is not perfect, (ii) there exists a costly banking system, and (iii) there is an externality 
affecting individual banks’ decisions. The results suggest that the path of reserve requirements would depend 
on the type of shock that the economy receives and the effect that this shock produces on the interest rate. 
Interestingly, the size of the risk premium will affect the reaction of the economy to the shock. It is also shown 
that the dynamic adjustment will be slightly different for permanent and temporary shocks, and it will also 
depend on the access that the economy has to foreign funds. 
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Reserve Requirements, Bank Runs, and Optimal Policies 




    “Saving for a rainy day” is well understood in all economic fields. If regulators want to 
apply this policy to the amount of liquidity that banks should hold, they will say 
"accumulate liquidity in normal times and use it in bad times", which in principle seems 
intuitive and reasonable. But, the evidence does not support this conventional wisdom. In 
fact, it suggests that the policymaker "flips a coin" when bad times arrive. This paper 
shows that resorting to the liquidity accumulated during the good days will depend on the 
underlying shock and the state of the economy at the time of the shock. Also, it shows 
that the same shock will generate a "cloudy day" under some circumstances and will not 
under others.
1 Therefore, the policymaker's reaction could be understood as an optimal 
response to different situations, instead as of "flipping coins". 
    Liquidity provision is key in the management of systemic banking crises, especially in 
emerging economies, where the lack of systemic liquidity can exacerbate problems. On 
one hand, without enough support, a liquidity crisis could lead to a solvency crisis and/or 
a credit crunch in the economy. On the other hand, the overuse of rediscounts or repos to 
provide liquidity assistance could lead to excessive money printing, and could weaken 
the peg in a fixed exchange rate regime or generate inflationary pressures. 
    There  is  evidence  that  shows  that  during the 90's several central banks provided 
systemic liquidity to finance the bank runs generated in the financial crises.
2 In general, 
the liquidity support includes all the funds provided to the system through rediscounts, 
repos, contingent contracts, and the reduction of reserve requirements.
3 This last 
instrument is the focus of the paper. 
                                                 
1 Continuing with the weather comparison, having one week of rain is a very bad shock if you live in LA 
(think about finding an indoor place to eat on UCLA's campus!) but it is a normal day in London. 
2 For more details see Lindgren, C. et al. (1999). 
3 Reserve requirement is the ratio of liquid assets over deposits imposed by the monetary authorities to 
commercial banks. A reduction in the requirement allows banks to use some liquid reserves that would 
otherwise be immobilized in their balance sheets.   2
    The  literature  on  the  optimality  of  maintaining a stock of liquid reserves is broad 
(Baltensperger (1974), Santomero (1984), Cothren and Waud (1994), Stein (1995), 
Agénor et al. (2000)). Also, there are some works that analyze the use of reserve 
requirements from a macroeconomic standpoint: as a countercyclical tool (Edwards and 
Végh (1997), Calvo et al. (1993)), as a mechanism to enforce capital requirements 
(Fernandez and Guidotti (1996)), or as an instrument that helps to collect the inflation tax 
(Englud and Svensson (1988)). There are some other papers that study optimal policies 
under financial crises (Lahiri and Végh (2003); Rebelo and Végh (2001), Ganapolsky 
(2003)).
4 But, in spite of the importance of reserve requirements as a liquidity provider, 
there is no work that studies its optimal use in a financial crisis. 
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to understand the behavior of 
reserve requirements as the outcome of an optimal policy decision. In particular, it 
rationalizes the pattern of reserve requirements and other macroeconomic variables in the 
aftermath of a bank run.
5 
    With that aim, the paper develops a general equilibrium model that departs from the 
standard small open economy (SOE) model in three dimensions: (i) capital mobility is 
not perfect, (ii) there exists a costly banking system, and (iii) there is an externality 
affecting individual bank's decisions. 
    The  imperfect  capital  mobility  is  introduced through an upward sloping supply of 
funds curve. Technically, this assumption will allow the study of interest rate shocks in 
the SOE set up, providing a mechanism for adjusting to a new steady state.
6 Also, this is a 
realistic assumption for most emerging markets, which tend to pay a risk premium on 
their debt. With perfect capital mobility, countries would be able to completely finance a 
bank run abroad, and nothing would happen domestically. But if the cost of funds 
increases with the amount borrowed, it would not be optimal to finance the run totally 
                                                 
4 In general, they are concerned with the defense of the exchange rate in a balance-of-payment type of 
crisis, using international reserves and interest rate as the main policy instruments. 
5 The relevance of reserve requirements in the management of systemic liquidity depends on several 
features of the economy in consideration, as the degree of capital mobility, the existence of some kind of 
illiquidity costs and the degrees of freedom to perform monetary policy. They are important for example in 
economies with fixed exchange rates, currency board arrangements, or even flexible exchange rates where 
the stock of deposits is highly dollarized. 
6 For other mechanism to close the SOE model under interest rate shocks see Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. 
Uribe (2001). The purpose of those mechanisms is to generate some transitional dynamics that put the SOE 
in a steady state, otherwise it will diverge forever.   3
abroad; thus, some domestic adjustments would occur. Obviously, the importance of this 
margin will depend on the size of the risk premium, economies paying high interest rates 
will react differently than economies paying lower rates. 
    Banking activity is costly because of the assumption that there are some operational 
expenditures related to the bank's assets management, which are reduced if part of the 
portfolio is invested in liquid assets. 
    The externality consists of individual banks considering only their own liquidity in 
their optimization problems, and forgetting the effect of aggregate liquidity in their 
decisions. Therefore, to improve the welfare of the economy the government should 
intervene by making the bank internalize the benefits of aggregate liquidity. 
    The results suggest that the path of reserve requirements would depend on the type of 
shock that the economy receives and the effect that this shock produces on the interest 
rate. For instance, a permanent negative output shock will produce a withdrawal of 
deposits but will affect neither the interest rate nor the reserve requirements. Only when 
the interest rate is increased, will the opportunity cost of holding liquidity be higher and, 
therefore, be worth reducing the stock of liquid assets. 
    This paper analyzes in detail the response of the economy to an interest rate shock. 
Interestingly, the size of the risk premium will affect the reaction of the economy to this 
shock. An increase in the international interest rate will generate a flight "from" deposits 
when the risk premium is high enough, but will generate a flight "into" deposits for low 
risk premia. Also, the magnitude of the bank run in the first case will be directly related 
to the size of the risk premium. 
    It is also shown that the dynamic adjustment will be slightly different for permanent 
and temporary shocks, and it will also depend on the access that the economy has to 
foreign funds. In general, these paths are consistent with the evidence presented in 
Section 2. 
        The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows evidence and analyzes some 
episodes of deposits drainage during the last two decades in Asia, Europe and Latin 
America. Section 3 presents a SOE model with perfect foresight, imperfect capital 
mobility and costly banking. Section 4 studies the bank runs generated in that context by   4
interest rate shocks. Section 5 analyzes the bank runs produced by output shock. Finally, 
Section 6 summarizes the main findings. 
 
2. The evidence 
 
    Choosing the bank runs episodes to analyze could be done following two different 
routes: an episodic approach or a mechanical rule. Given that the purpose of the paper is 
to understand the behavior of reserve requirements in a particular type of banking crisis, a 
liquidity crisis, the mechanical rule is chosen. The episodes are defined according to the 
following rule: a bank run is an episode where there is at least a 5% reduction in total 
deposits, during at least 2 months in a row, and it lasts until deposits start to recover 
again.
7 The problem of analyzing the episodes defined in previous literature, is that the 
definition of a banking crisis is broad. It could refer to a liquidity problem, a solvency 
problem or both. Following the rule defined above, the paper focuses just on those cases 
where liquidity was the main issue. 
    Following  that  definition  we  construct Table 1 with data from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database. We use monthly data (quarterly when not available) to 
search for bank runs in Asia, Europe and Latin America during the period January 1980 
to December 2002. The deposits series include demand, saving and time deposits of 
deposit money banks. The reserve ratio series is the ratio between liquid reserves and 
total deposits of the same group of banks. 
    We found 94 episodes of what we call a bank run. Interestingly, only in 49% of the 
episodes the reserve ratio was reduced. The percentages are very different across 
different regions as Table 2 shows. Europe and Latin America seem to give more support 
to the conventional wisdom than the Middle East and Transition Countries. On one 
extreme, in 63% of the cases in Europe the reserve ratio falls; on the other, only 31% of 
the cases in the Middle East show a reduction in the ratio. 
                                                 
7 Two qualifications are worth mentioning: (i) if deposits recover for one period and fall again in the next, 
then the run will be extended if the net contribution of the additional period is negative; (ii) some outlier 
cases were disregarded.   5
    In sum, as was mentioned in the introduction, we cannot say that the evidence suggests 
that liquid reserves are always reduced during a deposit drainage. 
    We also study in more detail some of the cases presented in Table 1. The criterion to 
choose the cases was based on two pillars: (i) we pick the cases that overlap with the 
episodes mentioned in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), (ii) we focus on those with 
available data. Filtering with this criterion, we obtained five cases to analyze in more 
depth: Argentina 1994/95, Estonia 1992/93, Lithuania 1995/96, Spain 1982/83 and 
Sweden 1992. 
    In Figure 1, the first chart for each country shows the evolution of deposits, credit and 
the reserve ratio. The common feature of the crises is that there is a fall in deposits that is 
not matched by the reduction in domestic credit. 
    We also observe that in Argentina, Sweden and Lithuania the reserve ratio falls. These 
facts should be interpreted with the balance-sheet identity of the financial system in mind, 
, s Liabilitie Assets ≡  
.       worth Net s liabilitie Other Deposits Credit reserves Liquid + + = +  
    If other liabilities and net worth do not change, the fall in deposits should be absorbed 
either by a fall in liquid reserves or a fall in credit. Obviously, if liabilities as a whole do 
not change, assets would not change either, but this is not what should be expected in a 
crisis when capital is flowing out of the country. In those situations banks also find it 
harder to levy more capital or issue more debt. Therefore, it seems that systemic liquidity 
buffered the shock on domestic credit in these 3 countries.
8 
        The second chart for each country presents the evolution of interest rates and the 
reserve ratio. In the cases of Argentina, Lithuania, Spain and Sweden both variables are 
negatively correlated, but in Estonia they are positively correlated. 
    We show the paths of the current account and GDP of each country in the last charts. 
We can see there that in all the cases the current account improves (when compared with 
the same quarter of the previous year) immediately after the crisis, except in Sweden 
where the current account becomes more negative on impact and it recovers later. 
                                                 
8 It is worth mentioning that in Spain there were some changes in regulation at that time due to the entrance 
of some foreign banks into the system.   6
    Summarizing, we have several episodes of bank runs where the responses to the crises 
are not always the same. This is precisely what we expect, given that not all the countries 
received the same shock (in some of them interest rate went up and in others it went 
down), the countries were not in the same situation and the international environment 
during the 80's was quite different than during the 90's. 
 
3. The model 
 
    Consider a SOE populated by infinitely lived households, with a banking sector and a 
government. In this economy there exists only a tradable good, ct, which is the numeraire, 
and the law of one price holds. Both assumptions together imply that, P=P
*=1, where P 
is the price of the good in the domestic economy and P
* is the price of the good in the 
world market. In this world there exists capital mobility, but it is not perfect: the 
economy faces an upward sloping supply of funds.
9 This means that the country will pay 
a risk premium on its borrowing which depends on the net assets position at each point in 
time. In this case the interest parity condition will read as: 
, 0    ; 0 ) ( ' '    ; 0 ) ( '
), (
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 where it is the interest rate this "risky" economy pays, r
* is the risk free interest rate 
given in the international capital markets, and φ(kt) is the risk premium, which depends 




    The representative household derives instantaneous utility from the consumption of the 
good ct, according to the following utility function: 
∫
∞ − =




where u(.) is strictly concave, and β<1. 
                                                 
9 See for example, Harberger (1980).   7
    In this economy there is no cash. Assume then that the only way in which the agent can 
buy goods is paying with a debit card. To be able to use the debit card, it needs to have 
part of its wealth in a bank under the form of deposits, which can be used in any moment. 
In other terms, the household faces a deposit-in-advance constraint of the following 
form:
10 
(2)                  , t t c d γ ≥  
where  dt is the quantity of deposits held by the household, and γ is an exogenous 
parameter. 
    The representative agent has a portfolio composed by internationally traded bonds, that 
pay an interest rate it, deposits, that pay 
d
t i and loans, that cost 
l
t i . It will be assumed that 
the household does not internalize the effects of its actions on the interest rate it, that 
means it is given from the agent's point of view. 
(3)                  , t t
c
t t l d b a − + =  
 where at is the household's portfolio, 
c
t b is the bond's holding, and lt is the amount of 
loans. 
    The agent produces goods using its own labor as the only input, which is supplied 
inelastically and is normalized to 1, according to the following production function: 
, 1






f f n f y
 
where nt is the amount of labor supplied at time t. 
    The household needs some credit to be able to use its own labor endowment. It faces 
the following credit-in-advance constraint: 
(5)                  , ' t t n f l ρ ≥  
where lt is the amount of loans borrowed from the bank until time t, ρ is an exogenous 
parameter, and f′ is the marginal product of labor, which will be equal to the real wage in 
a decentralized economy.
11 
                                                 
10 It can be shown that this is a first order approximation of the actual deposit-in-advance constraint for 
continuous time. 
11 The purpose of this very simple supply side is just to generate an inelastic demand for loans. In this way, 
the stock of loans would be demand determined, and from the bank point of view they would play the same 
role as an illiquid asset.   8
    At each point in time, it produces and pays the cost of production, earns interest from 
its holdings of bonds and deposits, receives profits from the banks and consumes. The 
flow constraint for this agent is: 
(6)                  , ) ( ) ( t
d
t t t t t t
l
t t t t d i i c l i i y a i a − − − Ω + − − + = &  
where a &  is the instantaneous change in household's assets,  ) ( t
l
t i i − is the spread paid over 
loans, Ωt are banks' profits and  ) (
d
t t i i − is the opportunity cost of holding deposits.
12 
        Therefore the household’s problem is to choose the path for ct that maximize (1) 
subject to (6), (2), (4) and (5). 
    To solve the optimal control problem lets define the current value Hamiltonian as: 
(7)                  , )]} ( 1 [ ' ) ( { ) (
d
t t t t t
l
t t t t t t i i c f i i y a i c u H − + − Ω + − − + + ≡ γ ρ λ  
 where λt is the co-state variable, interpreted as the marginal value of the household's 
financial wealth at time t. 
    The first order conditions and the law of motion for the co-state variable are given by: 
(9)                                     ). (
(8)                  , )] ( 1 [ ) ( '
t t
d
t t t t
i







    Equation (8) says that at any point in time the marginal utility of consumption should 
be equal to the marginal value of wealth times the "effective" price of the good (which 
includes not only the price, 1, but also the opportunity cost of holding the deposits needed 





    The representative bank in this economy receives deposits and invests the proceedings 
either in a liquid asset with zero return (i.e. dollars or gold), an illiquid domestic asset 
(i.e. loans), or an internationally traded bond. 
        Its activity is costly, and the cost will depend on the way the bank manages its 
portfolio of assets. For every dollar the bank receives, it should decide if it buys the liquid 
                                                 
12 In the case of interest,  ) (
d
t t i i −  > 0, the deposit-in-advance constraint will always hold as equality.   9
asset, the internationally traded bond or if it gives a loan to the household. The last 
alternative is the most expensive, in the sense that the bank has to use resources to do the 
evaluation and to instrument each particular loan, while in the other two it can buy the 
assets in the market without any previous research on them. However, the two liquid 
assets are not perfect substitutes, the bank would spend more resources to operate in the 
international capital market than to keep the "dollars" received from the depositors in 
vault.
13 
    This cost can be interpreted as an operative cost, which is lower the simpler the bank's 
investment decisions are; in other terms, the more liquidity it holds.
14 The bank can 
reduce its costs holding a liquid asset, ht, which does not pay any interest, or holding an 
internationally traded bond, 
b
t b , which return is it. To keep the problem simple, I will 
assume that the only asset that permits cost reductions is the domestic one. That means 
that the effort of investing in loans is the same as investing in the international capital 
markets.
15 
    The cost function per unit of deposit assumes the following form: 

















where the superscript A stands for aggregate variables, which are not internalized by the 
individual bank.  This cost function tells that not only individual liquidity is important, 
but also that systemic liquidity matters.
16 
                                                 
13 Stein, J. (1995) presents a model to rationalize the effect of reserves on banks' funding costs. 
14 Catalán (2001), found some evidence for Argentina and Mexico in this sense. 
15 It is a fact that banks hold as part of their liquid portfolio not only "dollar bills" but also other kinds of 
highly liquid international bonds. And it is also a fact that the cost of investing in a liquid bond is not the 
same as the cost of giving a loan or keeping the dollars in vaults. Obviously, with more than one 
alternative, the banks would face a kind of portfolio problem, deciding the optimal weights of each asset in 
such a way that they minimize its "operational costs". 
It is not in the aim of this paper to analyze that portfolio decision, which in itself deserves careful attention. 
Instead, the purpose is to study the macroeconomic effects that are produced when the portfolio shrinks, 
without considering the consequences that could arise when its composition changes. Therefore, to keep the 
model simple, it is assumed that the liquid asset is the only one that reduces the banking costs. 
16 Operational costs would be reduced by systemic liquidity when some sort of externality exists in the 
economy. For example, when an individual bank run out of "cash" it could sell part of the illiquid portfolio 
to other domestic banks, or sell it in the international capital markets. Obviously, the latter alternative 
would be more expensive because the foreign counterparts would have less information about the domestic 
assets, and therefore the risk they would face is bigger. Therefore, the deeper the interbank market, the 
cheaper liquidity would be.   10
    The bank's balance sheet is given by: 
(11)                  , t
b
t t t t w b d l h + − = +  
 where wt is the net worth. 
    For simplicity, it is assumed that w0=0, and that the bank distributes all the profits as 
dividends, which implies that wt is always equal to zero. 
    The bank's problem is then to choose the level and composition of its portfolio that 
maximize its profits, 
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− + − = Ω ξ   
 subject to its balance sheet restriction (11). 
    When the bank solves this problem it determines the optimal level of liquidity from the 
private point of view, which will be different from the social optimum, given that it does 
not internalize the beneficial effects of aggregate liquidity. As it will be shown later, the 
social optimum requires the bank to hold more liquidity than the amount prescribed by 
the individual optimization problem. Therefore, the government will impose a reserve 
requirement that will be binding for each individual bank. This reserve requirement is 
given by: 
(13)                  . t t d h α =  
    Thus, the individual bank maximizes (12), subject to (11) and (13). 
    The solution of this problem is given by the following FOCs: 
(15)                                     . ) (











= − − ξ α
 
        Equation (14) says that the spread between lending and borrowing rates is a function 
of the cost incurred in managing deposits and the reserve requirement. In the costless 
case, there is no distortion in the banking activity and therefore the lending and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Another example has to do with the nature of the banking industry and its specific activity. When a bank 
has to decide a loan, as it was said above, it uses some resources to perform the evaluation of its potential 
customer, for example it will demand the services of a credit analyst. In a competitive environment, the 
individual bank is too small to affect the price of those specific services. Considering the industry as a 
whole, and to the extent that the resources used to perform the analysis of domestic customers would not be 
useful in other activities or countries, it would be big enough to affect the factor prices. Then, the 
competitive solution would led to an overuse of those resources relative to the monopsony case, and 
therefore more illiquid assets would be held in the former.   11
borrowing rates are the same. But, when there exists a distortion, the cost of that is 
transferred to the side of the market in which the bank has some kind of market power, in 
this case to depositors. The bank cannot transfer the cost to the borrowers because in that 
side of the market it is facing the competition of the international capital market. The last 
statement is reflected in the equation (15), in which the lending rate and the rate the 




    The government is a "Ramsey" planner that cares about the utility of the representative 
household, takes into account the resource restriction of the economy, and picks the 
allocations such that they could be implemented as a competitive equilibrium.
17 It does 
not have any budget constraint, or any other activity besides internalizing the effect of 
aggregate liquidity on the welfare of the economy. The planner's problem is then: 
∫
∞ − =
0 } , {









 subject to the aggregate resource constraint: 
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where: 













b b h k ≡ + + ≡ α  
 and the following implementability constraints derived form the household's and bank's 
FOCs: 
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    The solution of this problem is given by the following FOCs: 
(23)                                                                ), (
(22)                       , 0 ) )]}( ( ) ( [ {
(21)                  ), ( ' ) ( ' ' )] , ( 1 [
2 1
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17 The planner faces an upward sloping supply of funds curve but he does not internalize it in its decisions.   12
 where  µt is the multiplier associated to the resource constraint (17) and ϕ  is the 
multiplier associated to the implementability constraint (19). 
    Equation  (21)  gives  the  optimality  condition for consumption and equation (23) 
describes the optimal path that the multiplier should follow. 
    Finally, equation (22) sets the condition to compute the optimal reserve ratio. It shows 
a functional relationship between it and α of the form: 
0, g'       0, g(.)            ); ( > < − = α g it  
 then, 
(24)                  . 0 (.)         0 '      )            )); ( (
1 > < = = ξ α for q (α g q(.) k i q
-
t  
    The last equation shows that the optimal reserve ratio from the planner's point of view 
is different from the one computed by the representative bank.
18 The government should 
intervene in the decentralized economy to attain the first best allocation. A plausible way 





    The model presented above has intrinsic dynamic, therefore the steady state properties 
of this economy should be studied with a system of dynamic equations. 
    To characterize the equilibrium in the planner's problem, let construct a system of two 
differential equations in ct and kt. To capture the motion of ct over time, differentiate the 
planner's FOC, equation (21), with respect to time, and replace µt and  t µ &  by the 
expressions coming from equations (21) and (23), respectively. That yields:
19 
(25)                  )]}. ( ) ( 1 [ ' ) ( { ) ( ' ' ) ( ' α γξ γα γαφ β + + + − = t t t t k i k k i c u c u c & &  
    The motion of kt is given by the aggregate resource constraint: 
                                                 
18 In the representative bank's problem 
1 ) ( ξ α =
b g , while in the planner's problem  2 1 ) ( ξ ξ α + = g . 
1 ξ  and  2 ξ  are both negative, therefore  α α <
b . 
Not only there is a difference in the level of the ratio, but also the optimal path would be different, given 
that g
b and g do not necessarily establish the same functional relationship between the ratio and the interest 
rate. 
19 To simplify the algebra in the following discussion assumes u′′′(.)=0.   13
(26)                  )]. ( ) ( 1 [ ) ( α γξ γα + + − + = t t t t t k i c y k k i k &  
    This system displays saddle-path stability as it is shown in the Appendix. 
    Figure 2 shows how the steady state equilibrium looks in a phase diagram. The phase 
line  0 = c & is given by, 
(27)                  )]. ( ) ( 1 [ ' ) ( α γξ γα γαφ β + + + = t t k i k k i &  
    The phase line corresponding to  0 = k & is given by, 
(28)                  )]. ( ) ( 1 /[ ] ) ( [ α γξ γα + + + = t t t t t k i y k k i c  
    In the steady state both  0 = c & and  0 = k & , then the economy rest at the point A in Figure 
2, where: 
). (
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4. Bank runs generated by interest rate shocks 
 
        Let assume that the bank run is produced by an exogenous shock that makes the 
household cut instantaneously its demand for deposits. With that purpose, assume the 
shock is an unexpected increase in the international interest rate, r
*.  The same results 
would be obtained with a parallel upward shift of risk premium function. In other terms, 
there is an exogenous increase in the domestic interest rate. 
    What would happen after the economy is hit by the shock? 
    Focusing in the phase diagram presented in Figure 2, the  0 = c & phaseline shifts to the 
right every time the international interest rate is increased. Nevertheless, the change in 
the  0 = k & phaseline depends on the value of some parameters, like the risk premium 
function. 
 
Proposition 1   When φ′→0 the slope of the  0 = k & phaseline goes up, while when 
φ′→∞ its slope goes down. 
  Proof  See Appendix ■ 
   14
    This proposition has a very important implication about the reaction of the economy to 
an increase in the domestic interest rate. The economy would have a bank run when the 
risk premium it is paying is strictly positive and above a certain threshold. Given the 
initial motivation was to study how the economy reacts in a bank run, the paper focuses 
just in this case.
20 
 
4.1. Permanent increase in r
* 
 
    Figure 3.a illustrates the adjustment process the economy follows after a permanent 
shock on the international interest rate. 
    On impact, consumption jumps down to the point B (below the new steady state level), 
and the demand for deposits goes down accordingly. At the instant of the shock people 
change the composition of their portfolio, switching from deposits to bonds, which 
produces a "run" against the banks. 
    How does the representative bank finance the run? To answer this question it will be 
necessary to take a closer look at the bank's balance sheet. On the assets side, there exists 
some release of liquidity proportional to the loss in deposits (for each unit of deposit 
withdrawn, the bank recover α units of reserves), making the need for funds equal to (1-
α) per unit of deposit withdrawn. Loans cannot be reduced because they are inelastically 
demanded by the household (they are "illiquid" in some sense). The government relaxes 
the reserve requirement, because with the higher interest rate the optimal reserve ratio 
would be lower. Then, the bank can use these released liquidity to finance the flight of 
deposits, and it will borrow or lend abroad to equilibrate its balance sheet. 
    The paths of some macroeconomic variables are shown in Figure 4. The upper graphs 
reflect the dynamics in consumption and financial wealth derived from Figure 3.a. On 
impact, given the increase in the price of the good produced by the external shock 
consumption falls. It goes below the  0 = k & line, implying that the current account has an 
instantaneous surplus (k jumps up at time t). This means that the amount of national 
                                                 
20 Anyway, the analysis of the other case is very similar and it is interesting in itself because it could 
generate higher consumption on impact, and therefore a substitution from international assets towards 
deposits.   15
saving (the difference between output and consumption) is not compensated by the 
increase in the interest payments to foreigners. Just after the shock, consumption starts to 
recover, but it remains below the level of output for some time. The economy continues 
as before, it lends its excess of saving abroad, and financial wealth increases. 
    The path of the domestic interest rate is the mirror image of financial wealth's path 
given the form of the country's risk premium that is assumed, except on impact, when 
domestic interest rate is affected by the higher r
*. 
    The optimal reserve ratio varies according to the changes in domestic interest rate. It 
jumps down on impact with the higher interest rate and then starts to recover while 
interest rate is reduced. The path of systemic liquidity depends on both, the behavior of 
deposits and the optimal reserve ratio.
21 
    Finally, output in this economy is given by the inelastic supply of labor, the same as 
loans which are demand determined, and remains constant by assumption. 
 
4.2. Temporary increase in r
* 
 
    Figure 3.b shows the dynamic behavior of the economy after it is hit by a temporary 
shock to the international interest rate. 
    In this case, the phase lines move in the same way as before but they do not stay 
forever in that position. When the shock is temporary, the economy adjusts in such a way 
that it comes back to the initial steady state, which is the point A. The economy will 
never catch the new saddle path or reach the point C, because that would imply that at 
time T, when the shock is reversed, the economy would fall in a non-equilibrium path and 
would diverge forever. At time T the economy should be on the saddle path that will put 
it again on the initial steady state. 
    The following propositions are useful to pick the adjustment path. 
                                                 
21 From the deposit-in-advance constraint, on impact the discrete jump of deposits is, 
t t c d ∆ = ∆ γ ; and the 
time path is given by,  c d & & γ = . 
From the optimal reserve requirement equation, on impact the discrete jump of the ratio is,  ) ( t i q ∆ = ∆α ; 
and the time path is given by,  i q & & ' = α . 
From the reserve requirement constraint, on impact the discrete jump of liquidity is,  t t t d d h α α ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ; 
and the time path is given by,  d d h α α & & & + = .   16
 
Proposition 2   At time T, consumption jumps up in a discrete amount. 
Proof  See Appendix ■ 
 
Proposition 3   The longer lasting the shock, the bigger the initial jump of 
consumption. 
Proof  See Appendix ■ 
 
Proposition 4   The higher the level of indebtness, the bigger the initial jump of 
consumption. 
Proof  See Appendix ■ 
 
    Thus, with those pieces of information the equilibrium path can be picked and depends 
on the duration of the shock and the magnitude of kt. On impact, the economy jumps 
down, households reduce consumption and run to the banks to withdraw part of their 
deposits. The adjustment path will be different in an economy that receives a shock that 
last a short time or which has a small debt (therefore, it has access to international capital 
paying a low risk premium), from another in which the shock last a long time or which 
has a large debt (thus, it has to pay a huge risk premium). The intuition is clear, in the last 
case, financing the run with external funds will be very difficult or at least extremely 
expensive. To avoid paying such a huge cost, or even because the economy is rationed, it 
should finance the deposits' withdrawal with internal saving, inducing a strong fall in 
consumption (it jumps to the point B′). In the other case, it is still convenient to take more 
debt to buffer the impact on current consumption, which makes the economy to jump 
down to the point B.
22 
 
4.2.1. Case 1: Economies with non-restricted external borrowing 
    This  is  the  case  in  which  the  economy borrows abroad to buffer the impact on 
consumption, that means when the system jumps to the point B in Figure 3.b. 
                                                 
22 To interpret the graphs, the chapter labels the two cases using Proposition 4. Anyway, similar dynamic 
patterns would be obtained for economies with the same level of indebtedness but with shocks of different 
duration.   17
    On  impact,  the  increase  in  the  interest rate, and consequently in the price of 
consumption, makes households to cut down the amount of the good they are consuming. 
But, as it was said before, the economy has access to the international capital markets to 
finance part of the fall in current consumption. Therefore, the economy starts its 
adjustment path with an instantaneous current account deficit. Just after the initial shock, 
consumption starts to grow; it grows for some time after time T until it reaches the 
original steady state value. 
    Deposits follow the pattern of consumption, given that the only use of them is to 
finance the purchase of goods. An interesting result appears in this case. As it was 
mentioned above, when the economy has access to international capital markets the fall 
in consumption is lower than when there is not possibility to borrow abroad at a 
reasonable interest rate. That implies the run on deposits is buffered if the economy has 
access to external financing and worsened when it is difficult to access to the 
international capital markets. 
    Given that on impact the interest rate is higher, the optimal reserve ratio should be 
reduced, which releases some low cost funds to finance the deposits' flight. The 
requirements would be reduced until time T, when the shock is reversed. At this time, the 
government should start tightening again, increasing the ratio until it reaches the steady 
state level. 
 
4.2.2. Case 2: Economies with restricted external borrowing 
    This case could be thought as if the economy cannot borrow abroad. Then, given the 
increase in the international interest rate, consumption falls by more than in the Case 1, 
jumping to the point B′ in Figure 3.b. 
    Basically, the differences with Case 1 were commented before. Given the economy is 
paying an extremely high interest rate, it is not profitable to borrow in the foreign 
markets, therefore it starts to accumulate assets (or repaid its debt) by a strong reduction 
in consumption. The debt repayments are possible because consumption falls by more 
than the increase in the interest payments on the external debt, and therefore the country 
runs a current account surplus from t to T. The other important difference is a quantitative   18
one, deposits fall by more in this case than when the economy can borrow more easily in 
the international capital markets. 
    On impact, the interest rate increases in a discrete amount, but after time t it follows a 
downward path given the reduction in the risk premium, which implies that the 
government starts tightening immediately after the initial reduction of reserve 
requirements. 
 
5. Bank runs generated by output shocks 
 
        Other way in which a bank run can be produced in this economy is through an 
unexpected fall in output. 
 
5.1. Permanent fall in output 
 
    This is the case depicted in Figure 5.a. When there is an unexpected and permanent 
reduction in output, consumption adjusts immediately to the new steady state level. This 
jump in consumption will generate a proportional run out of deposits, given that it is no 
longer necessary to maintain the initial amount of them to finance purchases. The jump in 
consumption exactly compensates the change in output, and therefore there will be no 
effect on the current account and the net stock of assets. Given that the net foreign assets 
position of the economy does not change, the risk premium and the domestic interest rate 
do not change either. As it was shown above, the reserve requirement is a function of the 
domestic interest rate, thus it remains the same, even though deposits are flowing out 
from the system. 
 
5.2. Temporary fall in output 
 
    Figure 5.b shows the response of the economy to a temporary output contraction. On 
impact, consumption fall by less than output, as the permanent income hypothesis would 
suggest. Obviously, lower consumption will imply lower demand for deposits, which   19
generates an outflow of funds from the banks. Given that consumption does not adjust 
too much, the temporary excess of consumption over output should be financed abroad 
running a current account deficit. As long as consumption is above output, the economy 
reduces its net foreign asset position, pushing up the risk premium and the domestic 
interest rate. While the interest rate increases, the reserve requirement decreases. 
    After time T, when the shock is reverted, output overcomes the level of consumption, 
which remains below output for some time. During this period, the economy accumulates 
foreign assets through a current account surplus and the domestic interest rate starts to go 
down. This reduction in the interest rate, induce an increase in the reserve requirements 




    The conventional wisdom suggests that reserve requirements should be reduced in a 
bank run to provide liquidity to the financial system. However, the evidence does not 
show a clear pattern on this matter. In 48 out of 94 of the episodes identified in the paper 
the reserve ratio goes up. One of the purposes of the paper is to give a rationale to this 
seemingly contradictory behavior, explaining the path of reserve requirements as the 
optimal response to different shocks. 
    The results obtained from the model developed in the paper suggest that the path of 
reserve requirement is intimately related to the type of shock that the economy receives 
and its initial conditions. Key to the results is the negative relationship between reserve 
requirements and interest rates. If the shock does not affect the opportunity cost of 
holding reserves there will be no change in the optimal ratio, as it is the case of an output 
shock. On the other hand, when the interest rate goes up, it will be "cheaper" to finance 
the run with the hoarded liquidity. 
    The initial condition of the economy is mainly captured by the risk premium that the 
country is paying. It is shown that this premium acts as an amplifier of the run (also, it 
should be above a threshold for a given shock to generate a bank run) and it might change 
the dynamics of the current account. The intuition is clear, when the risk premium is high 
enough it would be very costly to finance the run borrowing in the international capital   20
markets and therefore it will be worth depleting the liquid reserves and saving 
domestically (reducing consumption and therefore the transactional demand of deposits), 
which would generate a current account surplus. If the access to foreign funds is cheaper, 
the economy can avoid the sacrifice of adjusting downward present consumption by 
borrowing in the international capital markets, which will generate a current account 
deficit. This result is useful to explain the different behavior of the current account 
observed in countries like Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania and Spain, from the one 
observed in others like Sweden. 
    Finally, an important lesson that could be learned from the paper is that other channels 
exist through which the risk premium contributes to the vulnerability of a SOE. The risk 
premium exacerbates the impact of a given shock; in this particular case it generates a 
larger bank run. Thus, policymakers have another good reason to implement policies 
consistent with the reduction of the country risk.   21
Appendix 
 
Stability properties of the dynamic system 
Proof It is known that the necessary and sufficient condition to have saddle-path 
stability is that the Jacobian matrix of the differential equations system has a negative 
determinant. In the case of interest, the solution of a system with 2 equations and 2 
unknowns will have 2 roots. A negative determinant means that one of those roots would 
be positive and the other would be negative, or in other terms the system would be stable 
in one dimension and unstable in the other. 
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Proposition 1 
Proof  The equation of the phaseline  0 = k & is given by: 
))]. ( ) ( ( 1 /[ ] ) ( [ α ξ α γ + + + = t t t t t k i y k k i c  
The slope in the (kt,ct) space is: 
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After the shock to r
*, the slope varies according to: 
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Proposition 2 
Proof At  time  T the international interest rate is reduced in a discrete amount. To see 
what happen with the consumption at that point in time it is useful to focus on equation 
(8) in the household's FOC, 
)]. ( 1 [ ) ( '
d
t t t t i i c u − + = γ λ  
(i) The price of consumption depends on r
* and kt among other things. Given that kt 
cannot jump and given the other exogenous variables, the change in the price of 
consumption is driven by the change in r
*. It jumps in the same direction as the 
international interest rate, which is easily seen from the derivative of the price with 
respect to r
*, 
. 0 ] ' ' ) [(
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(ii) The shadow price λT does not jump because its law of motion is governed by equation 
(9). 
Therefore from (i) and (ii) we can conclude that when r
* is reduced at time T, 
consumption goes up in a discrete amount. ■ 
 
Proposition 3 
Proof  It can be seen from equations (27) and (28) that on impact, the movement of the 
phaselines does not depend on the duration of the shock. In other terms, on impact, both 
phaselines move to the same place independently of having a permanent or a temporary 
shock.   23
When the shock is permanent, the system jumps straightforward to the new saddle-path, 
which will put it into the new equilibrium point. When the shock is temporary, the system 
would never reach the new saddle-path, but it should be on the old one at time T to be 
able to come back to the initial equilibrium point. 
By continuity, it can be said that the longer lasting the shock, the closer would be the 
"temporary" solution to the "permanent" one, and therefore the jump would be closer to 
the new saddle-path. ■ 
 
Proposition 4 
Proof  From Proposition 2 it can be seen that on impact consumption should decrease. 
Therefore: 




Total differentiation of the resource constraint gives: 
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The economy would start its adjustment process with a current account deficit if: 
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Taking limits to the RHS and assuming α>0 ∀ kt: 
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The limits above imply that there would not be any current account deficit at time t when 
the country is highly indebted. ■   24
Tables and Figures 
          
Table 1: Banks Runs and Reserves Ratios 
 
Country Episode  ∆ Deposits ∆  Reserve   Country Episode  ∆ Deposits ∆  Reserve  
         Ratio           Ratio 
East Asia                     
Indonesia  Dec 82 - Jan 83  (0.06)  (0.18)     Jun 97 - Jul 97  (0.12)  (0.03) 
   Jul 98 - Aug 98  (0.05)  0.04      Jan 99 - Mar 99 (0.06)  (0.02) 
Europe           Aug 00 - Sep 00 (0.05)  (0.01) 
Croatia  Mar 99 - May 99  (0.10)  0.18      Feb 02 - Jul 02  (0.20) 0.09   
Denmark  Jul 86 - Aug 86  (0.08)  (0.55)  Venezuela  Jul 81 - Aug 81 (0.05) 0.05   
   Jan 87 - Feb 87  (0.10)  (0.45)     Dec 87 - Jan 88 (0.07) 0.08   
   Jan 89 - Feb 89  (0.09)  (0.05)     Jan 92 - Mar 92 (0.09) 0.01   
   Apr 94 - Feb 95  (0.15)  (0.17)     Feb 99 - Mar 99 (0.05) 0.03   
   Oct 98 - Nov 98  (0.12)  (0.02)     Apr 01 - May 01 (0.05)  (0.00) 
   Jul 99 - Aug 99  (0.06)  (0.04)     Jan 02 - Mar 02 (0.16)  (0.04) 
Greece  Jan 83 - Feb 83  (0.13)  (0.21)  Middle East        
   Jan 91 - Feb 91  (0.05)  0.01   Iran, I.R. of  Oct 80 - Nov 80 (0.07)  (0.22) 
Ireland  Jan 82 - Feb 82  (0.35)  (0.54)  Jordan  Dec 93 - Jan 94 (0.09) 0.08   
   Feb 86 - Mar 86  (0.07)  0.16   Kuwait  Jul 82 - Aug 82 (0.05) 0.06   
   Jan 92 - Mar 92  (0.05)  (0.04)     Aug 91 - Sep 91 (0.06) 1.18   
Italy  Jan 91 - Feb 91  (0.05)  0.04   Pakistan  Jan 89 - May 89 (0.09)  (0.09) 
   Jan 97 - Nov 97  (0.12)  0.06   Syrian Arab Republic  May 82 - Jul 82 (0.10)  (0.29) 
Slovak Republic  Jan 94 - Mar 94  (0.06)  (0.02)     Feb 86 - Aug 86 (0.12)  (0.10) 
Spain  Jan 83 - Feb 83  (0.12)  2.14      Jan 96 - Feb 96  (0.07) 0.03   
Sweden  Apr 84 - Jun 84  (0.06)  0.34      Jan 98 - Mar 98 (0.12) 0.73   
   Mar 90 - Aug 90  (0.15)  (0.46)     Jan 99 - Mar 99 (0.11) 0.13   
   Jul 92 - Oct 92  (0.07)  (0.62)     Aug 01 - Sep 01 (0.09) 0.11   
Latin America        United Arab Emirates  Jan 81 - Feb 81  (0.06) 0.22   
Argentina  Dec 94 - Apr 95  (0.17)  (0.06)     Jul 90 - Sep 90  (0.18) 0.12   
   Jul 01 - Dec 01  (0.18)  (0.01)  Transition Economies      
   Feb 02 - Apr 02  (0.13)  (0.08)  Armenia  Sep 95 - Oct 95 (0.16) 0.14   
Bolivia  Jun 89 - Jul 89  (0.17)  0.10      Mar 99 - Apr 99 (0.09)  (0.16) 
   Jun 02 - Jul 02  (0.15)  1.07      Dec 01 - Feb 02 (0.16) 0.20   
Chile  Jan 83- May 83  (0.09)  0.01   Azerbaijan  Nov 95 - Jun 96 (0.48) 0.86   
   Jan 00 - Feb 00  (0.07)  (0.26)     Dec 97 - Mar 98 (0.11)  (0.22) 
Colombia  Feb 83 - Mar 83  (0.05)  (0.12)     May 99 - Jun 99 (0.34) 0.37   
Dominican Republic  Apr 80 - May 80  (0.05)  0.16      Jan 01 - Feb 01  (0.51) 0.46   
   Jan 81 - Jul 81  (0.07)  0.18      Jan 02 - Apr 02 (0.14) 0.03   
   Jun 82 - Sep 82  (0.07)  0.08   Estonia  Aug 92 - Sep 92 (0.12) 0.23   
   Jul 87 - Aug 87  (0.06)  0.07      Dec 92 - Apr 93 (0.27) 0.64   
Ecuador  Jan 81- Feb 81  (0.10)  (0.20)  Georgia  Sep 98 - Nov 98 (0.21)  (0.08) 
   Jan 87 - Feb 87  (0.05)  (0.20)     Mar 99 - Apr 99 (0.10) 0.17   
Guatemala  Aug 83 - Oct 83  (0.09)  (0.02)     Dec 00 - Feb 01 (0.10) 0.09   
   Sep 87 - Nov 87  (0.06)  (0.03)  Kazakhstan  Dec 97 - Feb 98 (0.16)  (0.50) 
   Feb 94 - Mar 94  (0.06)  (0.09)     Sep 98 - Mar 99 (0.13) 0.19   
   Oct 95 - Jun 96  (0.07)  (0.02)     Jan 02 - Feb 02  (0.06)  (0.19) 
   Jul 98 - Aug 98  (0.16)  0.37   Lithuania  Dec 95 - Jul 96  (0.20)  (0.21) 
   Jan 99 - Feb 99  (0.07)  (0.03)     Jan 99 - Feb 99  (0.05)  (0.27) 
Mexico  Nov 00 - Jan 01  (0.06)  0.09   Moldova  Feb 94 - Mar 94 (0.19) 0.07   
   Jan 02 - Apr 02  (0.10)  (0.03)     Feb 95 - Mar 95 (0.06)  (0.03) 
Paraguay  Jun 84 - Sep 84  (0.07)  (0.05)     Jul 98 - Nov 98 (0.17) 1.08   
   Jan 85 - Feb 85  (0.07)  (0.09)  Tajikistan  Feb 99 - Mar 99 (0.24) 0.32   
   Jul 85 - Oct 85  (0.13)  (0.09)     Mar 01 - Apr 01 (0.11) 0.50   
   Jan 89 - Feb 89  (0.06)  0.00   Ukraine  Oct 97 - Nov 97 (0.06) 0.08   
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Table 2: Reserve Ratio Response 
 
   # of runs  Reduced RR  Increased RR 
         Lower rates  Higher rates  No info 
Total 94    49%  11%  11%  32% 
East Asia  2   50%     50%    
Europe 19    63%  16%  5%  16% 
Latin America  36   58%  8%  6%  28% 
Middle East  13   31%     8%  62% 
Transition Economies  24   33%  17%  21%  38% 
         
Source: Own calculations based on IFS data.        
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